8 found
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  1. Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement (Revisited).Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (3):243-259.
    This paper discusses the Uniqueness Thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness.
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  2. Countering Justification Holism in the Epistemology of Logic: The Argument from Pre-Theoretic Universality.Frederik J. Andersen - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Logic 20 (3):375-396.
    A key question in the philosophy of logic is how we have epistemic justification for claims about logical entailment (assuming we have such justification at all). Justification holism asserts that claims of logical entailment can only be justified in the context of an entire logical theory, e.g., classical, intuitionistic, paraconsistent, paracomplete etc. According to holism, claims of logical entailment cannot be atomistically justified as isolated statements, independently of theory choice. At present there is a developing interest in—and endorsement of—justification holism (...)
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  3. Logical Akrasia.Frederik J. Andersen - forthcoming - Episteme.
    The aim of this paper is threefold. Firstly, §1 and §2 introduce the novel concept logical akrasia by analogy to epistemic akrasia. If successful, the initial sections will draw attention to an interesting akratic phenomenon which has not received much attention in the literature on akrasia (although it has been discussed by logicians in different terms). Secondly, §3 and §4 present a dilemma related to logical akrasia. From a case involving the consistency of Peano Arithmetic and Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem (...)
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  4. Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews
    While the epistemic significance of disagreement has been a popular topic in epistemology for at least a decade, little attention has been paid to logical disagreement. This monograph is meant as a remedy. The text starts with an extensive literature review of the epistemology of (peer) disagreement and sets the stage for an epistemological study of logical disagreement. The guiding thread for the rest of the work is then three distinct readings of the ambiguous term ‘logical disagreement’. Chapters 1 and (...)
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  5. Uniqueness and Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):7-18.
    This paper discusses the uniqueness thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine the initial motivation for uniqueness.
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  6. Modeling Deep Disagreement in Default Logic.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Logic 21 (2):47-63.
    Default logic has been a very active research topic in artificial intelligence since the early 1980s, but has not received as much attention in the philosophical literature thus far. This paper shows one way in which the technical tools of artificial intelligence can be applied in contemporary epistemology by modeling a paradigmatic case of deep disagreement using default logic. In §1 model-building viewed as a kind of philosophical progress is briefly motivated, while §2 introduces the case of deep disagreement we (...)
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  7. Process Reliabilism, Prime Numbers and the Generality Problem.Frederik J. Andersen & Klemens Kappel - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (2):231-236.
    This paper aims to show that Selim Berker’s widely discussed prime number case is merely an instance of the well-known generality problem for process reliabilism and thus arguably not as interesting a case as one might have thought. Initially, Berker’s case is introduced and interpreted. Then the most recent response to the case from the literature is presented. Eventually, it is argued that Berker’s case is nothing but a straightforward consequence of the generality problem, i.e., the problematic aspect of the (...)
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  8. Hvad er Konsekventialisme?Frederik J. Andersen - 2022 - Refleks 56 (1):34-41.
    Den filosofiske position konsekventialisme er ofte genstand for debat i filosofikredse, men alt for hyppigt opstår der misforståelser blandt de involverede, fordi de ikke er eksplicitte, hvad grundantagelser og væsentlige distinktioner angår. Denne korte artikel vil give en approksimation af, hvad der forstås ved konsekventialisme på et generisk niveau. Målet med artiklen er at klargøre nogle af de grundantagelser og distinktioner, som konsekventialister ofte benytter i deres teoridannelse, og som bør holdes for øje i ønsket om en frugtbar debat.
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